The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
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October 2002
John W. Garver
In the post-Cold War era, relations among countries in Asia have undergone a dramatic change. A new strategic triangle overlays the region. Old rivals China and India have emerged as strong regional powers, as evidenced by impressive economic growth, the development of nuclear arsenals, and demonstrated ambitions for influence in the Pacific and South Asian theaters. While China’s role as an economic and geostrategic player is more widely recognized, India is now a regional competitor to be taken seriously. And with the unprecedented U.S. military presence in South Asia due to the war against terrorism, a third player —the world’s remaining superpower—is now involved in the historic Sino-Indian rivalry. As long as the United States retains this position and stays engaged in the region, managing this emerging U.S.-China-India strategic triangle will be an important issue for U.S. strategic thinkers.
In this issue of the NBR Analysis, Dr. John Garver, professor of international relations at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, traces the origins and possible future of the new triangle. According to Dr. Garver, while concerns about China have frequently driven relations among the three ountries in the last decade, Beijing understood the rules of the triangular game long before Washington or New Delhi. Chinese leaders learned early that playing the United States against India, particularly on issues of nuclear armament and nonproliferation, was a means to gain favor with Washington, while diminishing New Delhi’s role in international politics. As U.S. leaders realized that relations with the Northeast Asian giant had consequences for relations with the South Asian giant—and vise versa—they grew more sensitive to the triangular dynamic.
America’s strategic reengagement with Pakistan, key role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and military presence for the first time in Central Asia significantly increase its ability to benefit or injure the interests of India and China vis-à-vis one another. As both China and India seek geostrategic advantage in Southeast and South Asia, U.S. support for democratic India (or for India’s efforts to subordinate Pakistan) will fan Chinese nationalism and fears of containment. Conversely, U.S. acquiescence to greater Chinese presence in India’s perceived realm of influence will alarm leaders in New Delhi.
According to Dr. Garver, there are few, if any, short- to medium-term catalysts that would convince China and India to align against the United States, especially as both countries see cooperation with Washington as vital to economic growth. Dr. Garver asserts that Beijing may periodically pursue Sino-Indian cooperation on a given issue, but only because it will "cost India much more than China in terms of U.S. goodwill." The deep geopolitical rivalry between India and China, combined with the expanded influence of the United States, makes U.S. support of one Asian rival against the other an extremely important strategic factor. Dr. Garver concludes that, unless Beijing softens its generally abrasive policies of the 1990s, the coming years will witness closer relations between the United States and India, among China’s other neighbors.
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